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Comments
"Face-to Television Screen-to
Face": Testimony by Closed-Circuit
Television in Cases of Alleged Child
Abuse and the Confrontation Right
There is something in a face,
An air, and a peculiar grace,
Which boldest painters cannot trace.*
Today we have means of communication not available only a
few years ago. We can now by electronic means project the
image and voice of man clearly and distinctly at the speed of
light and control that means and insure its integrity by closed
circuit and monitors.**
INTRODUCTION
Commentators argue that the experience of a child who
testifies at trial, as an accuser of child abuse, is quite traumatic.'
* W SomERVLLE, TnE LucKY HIT (1727).
** Kansas City v. McCoy, 525 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Mo. 1975).
See Bauer, Preparation of the Sexually Abused Child for Court Testimony, I 1
BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 287 (1983). "Invariably the trial adds procedural
assault to the initial sexual assault, with the child carrying considerable responsibility
for its outcome. Subsequent guilt feelings, distortions, and denials are frequently en-
countered; such psychiatric residuals require treatment and emotional support." Id. at
287; Liba,, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal
Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 977 (1968-69).
Psychiatrists have identified components of the legal proceedings that are
capable of putting a child victim under prolonged mental stress and en-
dangering his emotional equilibrium: repeated interrogations and cross-
examination; facing the accused again; the official atmosphere in court;
the acquittal of the accused for want of corroborating evidence to the
child's trustworthy testimony; and the conviction of a molester who is the
child's parent or relative.
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Although no agreement exists that child abuse is increas-
Id. at 984; Vartabedian & Vartabedian, Striking a Delicate Balance, JmoDES' J., Fall
1985, at 16.
There are few communication settings with a higher apparent stress factor
than that involved in the testimony of the child victim of sexual assault.
The child who is aware and articulate enough to be qualified by the judge
to testify can be affected by feelings of guilt, fear, and isolation.
Id. at 18; Weisberg, Sexual Abuse of Children: Recent Developments in the Law of
Evidence, CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTs. J., Fall 1984, at 2.
The American criminal justice system requires that the victim of a criminal
offense come forward and make a public complaint against the alleged
perpetrator. When a child victim of a sexual offense is involved in the
prosecution of an offender, typically the child is treated in the same manner
as an adult victim. Although procedures vary from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion, most states require several separate interviews, usually conducted by
police and the district attorney among others. The victim must answer
numerous questions concerning the incident, such as information on dates,
time, sequence, description of the suspect and of the offense location. The
victim may be obliged to identify the offender by picture or line-up. A
preliminary hearing may occur, during which the victim must again recount
details of the offense. If the suspect fails to plead guilty, a trial ensues in
which the victim again testifies and is subject to cross-examination while
facing the accused. Such testimony, if given in an adult criminal proceed-
ing, takes place in a public courtroom. This process may last from several
months to several years.
Id.; see also Reply Brief for Petitioner, Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658 (1987).
The significant conflicts among the interests of the state, the defendant
and the victim come into sharpest focus in child sexual abuse cases. The
only eyewitness is usually a child of tender years who has been betrayed
by a powerful, trusted adult. Asking such a witness to understand, not to
be afraid, and to respond in a courtroom as a mature adult is asking too
much in most cases. For this reason, many charges will never be prosecuted.
Id. at 12. But see Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support
of Petitioner, Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658 (1987). "Thus far, [however,] no
compelling case has been made that sexually abused children as a class are sufficiently
different from other witnesses to justify abrogation of [the] longstanding attributes of
[our] adversary system." Id. at 15 (quoting Melton, Children's Testimony in Cases of
Alleged Sexual Abuse, to be published in ADVANCES IN DEVELOPMENTAL AND BEHAVIORAL
PEDIATRICS (Wolrach & Routh eds. 1987)).
[P]articularly for young children, it is equally plausible that children's
responses are less severe on average than those of adults. Provided that
parents and others do not overreact and that they are supportive of the
child during the legal process, it may well be that the trial experience will
cause little trauma. At least for some child victims, the experience may be
cathartic; it provides an opportunity for taking control of the situation,
achieving vindication, and symbolically putting an end to the episode.
Id. at 16-17 (quoting Melton, Sexually Abused Children and the Legal System: Some
Policy Recommendations, 13 AM. J. FAm. TiERAPY 61, 64-65 (1985)).
Amicus is aware of no social science studies that have focused exclusively
on the psychological effects on child victims of sexual assault of testifying
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ing 2 cases of alleged child abuse continue to attract media atten-
tion. 3 In response to the heightened awareness of child abuse and to
the trauma child witnesses may encounter, many states have
enacted statutes that seek to protect the child from a possibly
in the presence of their alleged offenders. Until those studies have been
performed, however, it is possible to extrapolate, with some qualifications,
from the few existing studies on child victims' reactions to their involvement
in the legal process, including testifying in court. Essentially, those studies
suggest that although involvement in the legal process is harmful to some
children, it is beneficial to others. The significance of these findings for
the issues raised by this case is two fold: first, these studies show that
children's reaction to involvement in the legal process in general, and
testifying in courts in particular (without regard to the presence of the
alleged offender in the courtroom), are complex and variable; second, these
studies suggest that previously widely held assumptions about the effects
on child victims who participate as witnesses in the legal process are not
supported by the scientific data. Thus, existing studies in this area, both
by their results and by their example, caution courts and policymakers
concerned with the effects on child victims of testifying in front of their
alleged abusers, to proceed slowly and to avoid generalized assumptions in
this area.
Id. at 17-18.
2 Compare Child Sexual Abuse Victims in the Courts: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Juvenile Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
77 (1984) ("The molestation of children has now reached epidemic proportions. Even
by conservative estimates, a young American will be sexually molested once every two
minutes.") (statement of Senator Arlen Specter, Chairman, Subcommittee on Juvenile
Justice) with Vartabedian & Vartabedian, supra note 1, at 17 ("Investigations ... and
filings of criminal complaints have no doubt increased in part because of public aware-
ness campaigns. Children's television programming is peppered with public service an-
nouncements featuring child celebrities urging children to tell someone if they have been
abused. Many cartoon programs contain story lines with the same message.").
Certainly reported cases .have increased. See ABUSED CHMDREN iN AMERICA: VICTims
OF OFncIAL NEGLECT, REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND
FAmms, H.R. RP. No. 260, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987). Based on an extensive
survey with detailed statistics of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, this Report
indicates that "[c]hild abuse and neglect, as reported to State child welfare agencies,
have increased steadily since 1976 when reports were first available. Between 1981-85,
reports of child abuse and neglect rose by more than half (54.9%) nationwide." Id. at
1. "In 1985 alone, an estimated 1,876,564 children [in the United States] were reported
to child protective service agencies as having been abused or neglected .. " Id. at 4;
see also Lexington Herald-Leader, April 11, 1987, at B2, cols. 3-6 (According to the
Kentucky Department for Social Services, "[t]here were just over 2,000 confirmed sexual
attacks [on children reported in Kentucky during 1986], compared with 400 in 1980, and
10,160 cases of physical [child] abuse in 1986 compared with 3,811 in 1980.").
1 See, e.g., Postell, Preliminary Hearings in Mass Child Abuse Case, TRIAL, Nov.
1984, at 64-65 (an account of the preliminary hearings in a Los Angeles Municipal Court
in which four members of the Buckey family and three other teachers were charged with
208 counts of child molestation and conspiracy involving 42 children at the Virginia
McMartin Pre-School in Manhattan Beach, California).
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frightening testimonial experience.4 For example, some states
have created new hearsay exceptions which permit a child's out-
of-court statements to be admitted into evidence at trial;5 other
states have adopted procedures for the admission of a child's
videotaped deposition.6
The most recent legislative innovation involves the use of
closed-circuit television to present the live testimony of a child
witness. 7 Although procedures vary from state to state, some
4 See Handling Evidence and Testimony in Child Abuse Cases, JuDGEs' J., Fall
1984, at 2.
These new reforms, which primarily benefit prosecutors, are a response to
a growing public awareness about child abuse and the realization that often
the only witnesses to crimes against children are the children themselves.
Because young children in particular can be easily traumatized and con-
fused, some courts have created special provisions to elicit their testimony.
Id.
See, e.g., WAsH. REv. CODE § 9A.44.120 (1985).
6 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(7) (West Supp. 1987). Several courts have
addressed the issue of whether the admission into evidence of the videotaped deposition
or testimony of a child violates a defendant's confrontation right. See, e.g., United
States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979) (unconstitutional); State v. Melendez,
661 P.2d 654 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (constitutional); McGuire v. State, 706 S.W.2d 360
(Ark. 1986) (constitutional); People v. Johnson, 497 N.E.2d 308 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
(constitutional); State v. Tafoya, 729 P.2d 1371 (N.M. Ct. App.) (constitutional), cert.
denied, 728 P.2d 845 (N.M. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3026 (U.S. Feb.
12, 1987) (No. 86-1343); State v. Vigil, 711 P.2d 28 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (constitu-
tional); State v. Cooper, 353 S.E.2d 451 (S.C. 1987) (constitutional); Clark v. State, 728
S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (constitutional); Pierce v. State, 724 S.W.2d 928 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987) (constitutional); Amescua v. State, 723 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)
(constitutional); Buckner v. State, 719 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (unconstitu-
tional); Romines v. State, 717 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (unconstitutional);
Tolbert v. State, 697 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (constitutional); Long v. State,
694 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (unconstitutional), aff'd, No. 867-85 (Tex. Crim.
App. July 1, 1987); Alexander v. State, 692 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (consti-
tutional); Powell v. State, 694 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (unconstitutional); cf.
Gaines v. Commonwealth, 728 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1987).
We are of the opinion the [videotape] statute which permits testimony
from a child who has not been declared by the trial court competent to
testify as a witness is an unconstitutional infringement on the inherent
powers of the judiciary, as declared in Sections 27 and 28 of the Consti-
tution of Kentucky.
Id. at 527.
7 See ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1986); Auz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253(A)
(Supp. 1986); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
54-86g (West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (West Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-8-55 (Supp. 1987); HAW. R. EvID. 616(d) (1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8(b)
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statutes permit the child witness to testify in front of a television
camera in a room adjacent to the courtroom in the company of
the prosecuting and the defense attorneys who examine and
cross-examine the child.8 In the courtroom, the judge, the jury,
and the defendant watch the testimony on television monitors
outside the child's presence. 9
This Comment proposes that using closed-circuit testimony
in cases of alleged child abuse poses a serious threat to the
defendant's sixth amendment confrontation right 0 and, there-
fore, is unconstitutional." Following an examination of the pol-
(Burns Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14(1) (West Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-3434(a)(1) (Supp. 1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(3) (Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1986); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:283 (West Supp. 1987); MD' CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1987); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 16D (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (West Supp. 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405
(Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 65.00-.30 (McKinney Supp. 1987); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(C) (Anderson
1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753(B) (West Supp. 1987); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5985 (Purdon Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1986); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071(3) (Vernon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5(2)
(Supp. 1987); VT. R. Evn,. 807(e) (Supp. 1986).
1 See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(3) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986) ("[T]he
testimony of the child [shall] be taken in a room other than the courtroom and [shall]
be televised by closed circuit equipment. . . ."). Note that KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §
421.350(3) is identical to TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.071(3) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
But cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b) (west Supp. 1987) (The attorneys remain in the
courtroom and conduct examination and cross-examination by two-way closed-circuit
television.).
9 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIxM. PROC. LAW § 65.30(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987) ("The
courtroom shall be equipped with monitors sufficient to permit the judge, jury, defendant
and attorneys to observe the demeanor of the vulnerable child witness during his or her
testimony."); cf. Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(3) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986) ("The
court shall permit the defendant to observe and hear the testimony of the child in
person, but shall ensure that the child cannot hear or see the defendant.").
,0 For analysis of the problems of child witnesses, legislative innovations, and the
confrontation right, see generally Berliner, The Child Witness: The Progress and Emerg-
ing Limitations, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 167 (1985-86); Graham, Indicia of Reliability and
Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40
U. MIAu L. REv. 19 (1985-86); Mlyniec & Daily, See No Evil? Can Insulation of Child
Sexual Abuse Victims Be Accomplished Without Endangering the Defendant's Consti-
tutional Rights?, 40 U. MiAm L. REv. 115 (1985-86).
1 But see Note, The Constitutionality of the Use of Two-Way Closed Circuit
Television to Take Testimony of Child Victims of Sex Crimes, 53 FoRDtAm L. REV.
995 (1984-85).
Courts and commentators have tried and suggested various ways to balance
the defendant's right of confrontation and the state's interest in bringing
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
icies behind the confrontation clause, 12 this Comment analyzes
the issue of whether the closed-circuit testimony procedure per-
mits the accused to exercise his or her confrontation right. 13 This
Comment concludes that the use of television to present the live
testimony of a child witness is not a constitutionally permissible
substitute for physical confrontation.14
I. THE POLICIES OF CONFRONTATION
The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him. . . ." In Mattox v. United
child molestation cases to prosecution. The use of two-way closed circuit
television to take testiniony of child victims of sex crimes strikes the best
balance between these two interests. This narrow exception comports with
the Supreme Court's analysis of the right of confrontation and also pro-
vides a much needed, humane method of taking the testimony of the
victims of child molestation. As reports of child sexual abuse continue to
rise, this procedure will allow for an equitable treatment of both the
traumatized child victims and the alleged offenders.
Id. at 1018; Comment, Criminal Procedure: Closed-Circuit Testimony of Child Victims,
40 OKLA. L. REv. 69 (1987).
Oklahoma is to be commended for recognizing its duty to protect its
children both in and out of the courtroom. The closed-circuit television
statute is a step toward protecting children who would be further injured
by the legal system. It is certainly possible to apply the innovative procedure
without unduly restricting the defendant's right to confront adverse wit-
nesses.
Id. at 98; Comment, The Use of Closed-Circuit Television Testimony in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases: A Twentieth Century Solution to a Twentieth Century Problem, 23 SAN
DEGo L. REv. 919 (1986).
Society has a substantial and compelling need to protect child sexual abuse
victims from further psychological and emotional harm. Society also has
a compelling need to preserve the rights of defendants. These two needs,
however, are not mutually exclusive. They must be balanced against each
other, and their respective weights determined. Indeed, since [testimony via
two-way closed-circuit television] can be used without any substantial in-
fringement of a defendant's rights and because the need to protect the
victimized child witness is overwhelming, the scale must tip towards the
child.
Id. at 938.
,2 See infra notes 15-44 and accompanying text.
'1 See infra notes 45-109 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
" U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the Supreme
Court held that the confrontation right of the sixth amendment is binding upon the
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States,'6 the United States Supreme Court stated that the "primary
object" of this clause is to prevent the use of "depositions or ex
parte affidavits... against the prisoner in lieu of a personal exami-
nation and cross-examination of the witness.' ' 7 Also, the
clause gives the accused the opportunity of "compelling [the witness]
to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at
him, and judge.., his demeanor upon the stand."' 8 The intent
of the drafters of the Bill of Rights is unclear;' 9 therefore, the
states under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment:
The Sixth Amendment is a part of what is called our Bill of Rights. In
Gideon v. Wainwright, [372 U.S. 335 (1963)], in which this Court held
that the Sixth Amendment's right to have assistance of counsel is obligatory
upon the States, we did so on the ground that "a provision of the Bill of
Rights which is 'fundamental and essential to a fair trial' is made obligatory
upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." ... We hold today that
the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses
against him is likewise a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 403.
-6 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
,7 Id. at 242.
, Id.
19 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175-76 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring):
Similar guarantees to those of the Sixth Amendment are found in a number
of the colonial constitutions and it appears to have been assumed that a
confrontation provision would be included in the Bill of Rights that was
to be added to the Constitution after ratification. The Congressmen who
drafted the Bill of Rights amendments were primarily concerned with the
political consequences of the new clauses and paid scant attention to the
definition and meaning of particular guarantees. Thus, the Confrontation
Clause was apparently included without debate along with the rest of the
Sixth Amendment package of rights-to notice, counsel, and compulsory
process-all incidents of the adversarial proceeding before a jury as evolved
during the 17th and 18th centuries. If anything, the confrontation guarantee
may be thought, along with the right to compulsory process, merely to
constitutionalize the right to a defense as we know it, a right not always
enjoyed by the accused, whose only defense prior to the late 17th century
was to argue that the prosecution had not completely proved its case.
But cf. Graham, supra note 10, at 63 (citing Graham, The Right of Confrontation and
the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CIM. L. BULL. 99 (1972)):
The right of the defendant to confront available complaining witnesses
stems from the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. Sir Walter Raleigh was convicted
of treason after a trial by affidavit, without ever being able to confront
his accusers. Not only did the government fail to produce live witnesses,
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Supreme Court 20 and other authorities2" often discuss the language
of Mattox when interpreting the confrontation right.
Justice White, writing for the Court in California v. Green,22
expanded upon Mattox by explaining that the policies of the
clause provide basic safeguards.
Confrontation: (1) insures that the witness will give his state-
ments under oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness
of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of
a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-
examination, the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth"; (3) permits the jury that is to decide the
defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in
making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his
credibility. 23
Therefore, confronting the accused "with the witnesses against
him" 24 forces the government to provide procedures that give
the accused the ability to test the accuracy of the witness' ac-
cusations before the trier of fact. 25
Sir Walter Raleigh was not permitted to summon witnesses on his own
behalf.
2 See, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968). "The right to confrontation is
basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion
for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness." Id. at 725.
21 See, e.g., 5 J. WIoMosRE, EVIDENCE § 1395(1)-(2) (1974).
The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the
opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.... There is, however, a
secondary advantage to be obtained by the personal appearance of the
witness; the judge and the jury are enabled to obtain the elusive and
incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a
certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness.
Id. (emphasis in original); Note, Reconciling the Conflict Between the Coconspirator
Exemption from the Hearsay Rule and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
metit, 85 COLUM. L. Ray. 1294, 1302 (1985) ("The Mattox interpretation of the con-
frontation clause and its emphasis on cross-examination has been reaffirmed repeatedly
by the Supreme Court.").
- 399 U.S. 149 (1970):
23 Id. at 158 (emphasis added) (quoting J. WIMORE, supra note 21, at § 1367).
24 U.S. CONSr. amend. VI.
21 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 71 (1980) in which the Court stated that "the
principal purpose of cross-examination [is] to challenge 'whether the declarant was
sincerely telling what he believed to be the truth, whether the declarant accurately
perceived and remembered the matter he related, and whether the declarant's intended
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Contrary to the literal language of the sixth amendment,
however, the Supreme Court has fashioned an exception to the
requirement of physical confrontation between the defendant
and the witness. 26 In Ohio v. Roberts,27 the Court, in discussing
the admissibility of hearsay under the confrontation clause,
recognized that the clause establishes rules of necessity and trust-
worthiness. 29 To show necessity of admission, "[fin the usual
case . .. , the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate
the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to
use against the defendant. ' 30 To be trustworthy, the hearsay
statement must have "indicia of reliability" that "augment ac-
curacy in the fact finding process. ' 31 Hearsay, which meets the
Roberts test,3 2 is admissible at trial, even though the defendant
meaning is adequately conveyed by the language he employed.' "Id. (quoting Davenport,
The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions:
A Functional Analysis, 85 HARv. L. RaV. 1378, 1378 (1971-72)); see also Pointer, 380
U.S. at 404:
This Court in Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55, 56, referred to the
right of confrontation as "[o]ne of the fundamental guarantees of life and
liberty," and "a right long deemed so essential for the due protection of
life and liberty that it is guarded against legislative and judicial action by
provisions in the Constitution of the United States and in the constitutions
of most if not all the States composing the Union."
26 See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 78 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur cases have rec-
ognized the necessity for a limited exception to the confrontation requirement for the
prior testimony of a witness who is unavailable at the defendant's trial.").
- 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
20 Rule 801(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines "hearsay" as "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
21 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
10 Id. But cf. United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986).
Roberts must be read consistently with the question it answered, the
authority it cited, and its own facts. All of these indicate that Roberts
simply reaffirmed a longstanding rule ... that applies unavailability anal-
ysis to prior testimony. Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the
radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by
the government without a showing that the declarant is unavailable.
Id. at 1126. The Supreme Court has noted that most confrontation cases "fall into two
broad categories: cases involving the admission of out-pf-court statements and cases
involving restrictions imposed by law or by the trial court on the scope of cross-
examination." Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18 (1985) (per curiam).
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
'z The Court determined that "certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid
foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the
KENTUCKY LAW JOuRNAL[ 7
did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant
before the trier of fact.3
Recently, in Lee v. Illinois,4 a divided United States Supreme
Court 15 held that a trial judge violated Millie Lee's rights under
the confrontation clause. The judge, expressly relying on por-
tions of her codefendant's confession, found Lee guilty of a
double murder.3 6 Based on Roberts, the Court held that the
judge's reliance on the confession to convict Lee was unconsti-
tutional because the codefendant's statement "was presumptively
unreliable and it did not bear sufficient independent 'indicia of
reliability' to overcome that presumption. ' 37 The object of the
clause is to guard against the danger of a defendant's conviction
based on this "presumptively unreliable evidence." ' 38
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Lee, stressed that
the right to confront adverse witnesses promotes a fair system
of criminal justice "by ensuring that convictions will not be
based on the charges of unseen and unknown-and hence un-
challengeable-individuals. ' '39 He explained that the purpose of
'substance of the constitutional protection.' " Id. at 66 (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. at
244).
" See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243:
There is doubtless reason for saying that the accused should never lose the
benefit of any [confrontation] safeguards even by the death of the witness;
and that, if notes of his testimony are permitted to be read, he is deprived
of the advantage of that personal presence of the witness before the jury
which the law has designed for his protection. But general rules of law of
this kind, however beneficial in their operation and valuable to the accused,
must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the
necessities of the case. To say that a criminal, after having once been
convicted by the testimony of a certain witness, should go scot free simply
because death has closed the mouth of that witness, would be carrying his
constitutional protection to an unwarrantable extent. The law in its wisdom
declares that the rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order
that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused.
'4 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986).
11 Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices White,
Marshall, Stevens, and O'Connor joined. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist dissented. Id.
36 Id. at 2061. Lee and Edwin Thomas, her codefendant, did not testify at trial.
Their counsel withdrew motions for separate trials because the trial was without a jury
and the judge agreed to consider the evidence for each defendant separately. Id. at 2060.
17 Id. at 2061.
1, Id. at 2063.
1, Id. at 2062.
[VOL. 6
CLOSED-CiRcurr TESTmoNy
the right is essentially to advance reliability in criminal trials/ °
The "mechanisms of confrontation ' 41 that the Court identified
in Green 42-cross-examination of a witness under oath enabling
a jury to observe the demeanor of the witness-encourage pre-
sentation of reliable evidence at trial.43 To be constitutional under
the confrontation clause, the Court examines procedures, such
as the closed-circuit testimony procedure, to determine whether
they advance, not inhibit, the "truthfinding function of the
Confrontation Clause. "44
II. CLOSED-CIRCUIT TESTimONY AND THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE: A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
The basic policy behind the confrontation right is to ad-
vance the presentation of reliable and, ultimately, true evidence
in a criminal trial; therefore, the language of the sixth amendment
reflects "the Framers' preference for face-to-face accusation. ' 45
Advocates of closed-circuit testimony argue that procedures that
separate the child witness from the accused provide reasonable
and constitutional substitutes to confrontation in person;46 others
40 Id.
" Id.
42 See supra text accompanying note 23.
" Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2062.
44 Id.; see Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985). "[T]he Confrontation Clause's
very mission [is] to advance 'the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal
trials.' "Id. at 415 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)); see also Kentucky
v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658 (1987). "The right to cross-examination, protected by the
Confrontation Clause, thus is essentially a 'functional' right designed to promote
reliability in the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial. The cases that have arisen
under the Confrontation Clause reflect the application of this functional right." Id. at
2662-63.
" Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
46 See, e.g., Child Victim Witness Protection Act of 1985: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 95 (1985).
There is nothing in the Constitution that says that the right to the con-
frontation of the accused must be two feet, three feet or within the same
room. It simply says that the defendant has the right, to confront his
accuser. And we feel that with removing those constraints that technology
has removed, that you can interpret those issues of confrontation meaning
maybe not necessarily physical confrontation in a courtroom, but confron-
1987-88]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
disagree, emphasizing that the clause requires physical confron-
tation. 47 Ultimately, the constitutionality of the closed-circuit
testimony procedure under the confrontation clause depends upon
whether the procedure is fair to the defendant by facilitating the
production of trustworthy evidence. 4 Closed-circuit testimony is
trustworthy only if the "mechanisms of confrontation ' 49 are
present.
A. Cross-Examination
The closed-circuit testimony procedure presents two distinct,
practical problems which inhibit the defendant's ability to cross-
examine0 the child witness effectively. First, the child's depar-
ture from the courtroom eliminates the possibility of physical,
or face-to-face, confrontation between the accused and the wit-
ness. Second, procedures that separate the defendant from his
or her attorney5 during the child's testimony create communi-
cation difficulties that may inhibit full cross-examination of the
witness .52
tation through electronic means.
Id. (statement of H. Mark Kennedy, Circuit Court Judge, Montgomery County, Ala-
bama, and Chairman of the Children's Trust Fund for the State of Alabama); cf. Brief
for Petitioner at 18, Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658 (1987) ("The Confrontation
Clause does not guarantee presence for presence's sake. The right to confront or to be
present is ancillary to the right to test the reliability of evidence and thereby to advance
the truth-seeking function.").
- See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 234 (Ky. 1986) (Stephens,
C.J., dissenting).
41 See Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (1986).
41 Id.; see supra text accompanying note 23; see also People v. Algarin, 498
N.Y.S.2d 977, 981 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) ("Today, it is, thus, generally agreed that the
Confrontation Clause serves two distinct purposes: first and primarily, to secure the
opportunity of cross-examination and secondarily, to enable a jury to observe a witness'
demeanor when brought face to face with the accused.").
'0 The Supreme Court has stressed the importance of cross-examination. See, e.g.,
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) ("Cross-examination is the principal means
by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.").
11 The defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself. See Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) ("The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely
that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the
right to make his defense."); see also Wilis,,716 S.W.2d at 233 (Leibson, J., concurring)
("It is my opinion that where the defendant has legitimately undertaken to defend
himself pro se, his right to question all witnesses (including the child) cannot be
impaired."); Mlyniec & Dally, supra note 10, at 133.
52 See Willis, 716 S.W.2d at 235 (Stephens, C.J., dissenting).
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1. Elimination of Physical Confrontation
Before the advent of television, adequate cross-examination
demanded physicial confrontation between the accused and the
witness; 53 however, proponents of the closed-circuit testimony
procedure contend that it does not inhibit cross-examination of
the witness.5 4 Statutes that authorize courts to utilize the
procedure55 operate on the premise that testimony via closed-
circuit television is the equivalent of physical confrontation. 56
State v. Sheppard,57 a trial court opinion, is the first pub-
lished case concerning closed-circuit testimony of a child wit-
ness. 58 Sheppard was indicted for sexual assault upon his ten-
year-old stepdaughter.5 9 At a hearing in response to the prose-
cution's motion to present the child's testimony by closed-circuit
television, a forensic psychiatrist testified that the child's expe-
rience in open court would be traumatic. 60 The court decided
51 See J. WioMoRE, supra note 21, at § 1395 ("The opponent demands confron-
tation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by
him, but for the purpose of cross-examination, which cannot be had except by the direct
and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers.").
5' See, e.g., Child Sexual Abuse Victims in the Courts: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice,-supra note 2, at 81 ("[C]ontemporaneous examination
by means of closed circuit television permits examination of the witness by both the
prosecution and the defense in the presence of the defendants. The defendants therefore
will not be deprived of their sixth amendment rights of confrontation and cross-exami-
nation.") (statement of Lad Rubin, Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles, California);
Note, supra note 11, at 1013 ("The procedure proposed in this Note gives the defendant's
counsel full opportunity to cross-examine the child witness.").
I See supra note 7.
5 See, e.g., N.Y. Calm. PROC. LAw § 65.30(7) (McKinney's Supp. 1987) ("The
examination and cross-examination of the vulnerable child witness shall, in all other
respects, be conducted in the same manner as if the vulnerable child witness had testified
in the courtroom.").
484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
Apparently the only case before Sheppard that discusses the closed-circuit pro-
cedure and the defendant's right to confront the witness is Kansas City v. McCoy, 525
S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1975) (en banc). McCoy was convicted in municipal court of possession
of marijuana. On appeal, in circuit court and upon trial de novo, an expert witness
testified, by means of closed-circuit television which connected the crime laboratory with
the courtroom, that the substance the police found in McCoy's possession was marijuana.
Id. at 337-38. The Supreme Court of Missouri, affirming the 30-day conviction, held
that the procedure did not violate the sixth amendment. Id. at 339. See generally supra
the introductory quotation from McCoy.
11 Sheppard, 484 A.2d at 1331.
Id. at 1332.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
that "[a]dequate opportunity for cross-examination will be pro-
vided" and permitted the use of closed-circuit testimony.' The
court believed that "[tihe use of the video technique is a permissi-
ble restriction of cross-examination"; therefore, it held that the
procedure did not violate Sheppard's constitutional right to con-
front the child witness. 62 While the Sheppard court determined
that the absence of physical confrontation involved in televised
testimony realistically limited full exercise of cross-examination,6 3
other courts have held that the procedure acts as an interchange-
able substitute64 for "face-to-face ' 6 confrontation.
61 Id. at 1343. After the court's decision in Sheppard, the New Jersey legislature
passed a statute enumerating the closed-circuit testimony procedure. See N.J. STAT.
A4N. § 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1987).
6 Sheppard, 484 A.2d at 1349. The New Jersey Constitution, art. I, § 10 contains
a confrontation clause: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
... to be confronted with the witnesses against him ......
6 The court concluded: "The use of video technique is a permissible restriction
of cross-examination." Sheppard, 484 A.2d at 1349 (emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that the confrontation clause may
forbid restricted cross-examination at trial. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
"Viewed historically, then, there is good reason to conclude that the Confrontation
Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant's out-of-court statements, as long as the
declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination."
Id. at 158 (emphasis-added); see also Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658 (1987). The
trial court excluded Stincer from a hearing to determine whether the alleged victims of
Stincer's abuse were competent to testify. Id. at 2660. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
stressed that the trial court did not restrict Stincer's "ability to cross-examine the
witnesses at trial. Any questions asked during the competency hearing, which [Stincer's]
counsel attended and in which he participated, could have been repeated during direct
examination and cross-examination of the witnesses in [Stincer's] presence." Id. at 2664.
Concluding that the trial court did not violate the confrontation right, the Supreme
Court pointed out that Stincer "had the opportunity for full and effective cross-
examination of the two witnesses during trial." Id. at 2666 (emphasis added).
6" See Willis, 716 S.W.2d at 227, 230 (The procedures do not put restrictions on
cross-examination. "There is no constitutional right to eyeball to eyeball confrontation.
The choice of words 'face to face' may have resulted from an inability to foresee
technological developments permitting cross-examination and confrontation without
physical presence."); State v. Daniels, 484 So. 2d 941, 945 (La. Ct. App. 1986) ("IT]his
trial technique serves as the functional equivalent of in-court testimony."); Algarin, 498
N.Y.S.2d at 985 (The procedure preserves the right to cross-examine.). But cf. Herbert
v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (The defendant's right to
confront the witness is abridged when he is seated so that he can hear but cannot see
the child witness.).
61 While the U.S. Constitution, see supra text accompanying note 15, and many
state constitutions, see, e.g., supra note 62, state that the defendant has the right "to
be confronted," nineteen state constitutions use the words "face to face." See Amz.
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2. Difficulty of Defendant-Attorney Communication
The result of using the closed-circuit testimony procedure is
not simply the elimination of "face-to-face" or "eyeball-to-
eyeball'"' confrontation; statutes creating the procedure usually
require the defendant's attorney to join the prosecuting attorney
and the child for examination and cross-examination outside the
courtroom, while the defendant remains behind to watch the
testimony on a television screen with the judge, the jury, and
the public. 67 Although statutes may provide for a system of
audio communication between the defendant and his or her
attorney, 68 this separation hampers effective cross-examination.
CONST. art. 2, § 24; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7; ILL. CONST.
art. 1, § 8; IN. CONST. art 1, § 13; KAN. CONST. § 10; Ky. CONST. § 11; MASS. CONST.
Part 1, art. XII; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 18(a); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24; NEB. CONST.
art. I, § 11; N.H. CONST. Part I, art. 15; Omo CONST. art. I, § 10; OR. CONST. art. I,
§ 11; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7; TENN. CONsT. art. 1, § 9; WASH.
CONST. art. 1, § 22; WIs. CONSr. art. 1, § 7.
66 Willis, 716 S.W.2d at 231.
67 See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(b) (Supp. 1987):
(1) Only the following persons may be in the room with the child
when the child testifies by closed circuit television:
(i) The prosecuting attorney;
(ii) The attorney for the defendant;
(iii) The operators of the closed circuit television equipment; and
(iv) Unless the defendant objects, any person whose presence, in the
opinion of the court, contributes to the well-being of the child, including
a person who has dealt with the child in a therapeutic setting concerning
the abuse.
(2) During the child's testimony by closed circuit television, the judge
and the defendant shall be in the courtroom.
This statute fails to recognize that the trial judge is not a passive observer of a criminal
trial.' He may wish to question the child also. This statute requires the judge to remain
in the courtroom without any ability to ask the child questions or even to give immediate
supervision of the proceedings.
" See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:283(B) (West Supp. 1987) ("The court
shall also ensure that the defendant is afforded the ability to consult with his attorney
during the testimony of the child."). Some courts have found that the separation of the
attorney from the defendant is not significant as long as they can communicate with
each other by some means. See Daniels, 484 So. 2d at 943-44 ("[The defendant] was
able to maintain audio contact with her attorney throughout the child's testimony....
As long as the defendant can hear the child's testimony and can confer with her attorney,
the essential safeguards of cross-examination are preserved."); cf. Algarin, 498 N.Y.S.2d
at 980 ("[A] two-way private communication system was set up from the defense table
to the testimonial room so immediate conversations could take place among the defen-
dant and his attorneys.").
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Certainly, when the defendant has no means of communi-
cating with his or her attorney during the child's testimony, the
procedure is violative of the confrontation right.69 State v.
WarfordaO demonstrates that the absence of communication
drastically interferes with the defendant's ability to participate
in cross-examination by giving recommendations and suggestions
to his or her attorney during the prosecution's examination or
during cross-examination of the witness. Warford was convicted
of sexual assault on a child, the daughter of the woman with
whom he had been living.71 At trial, the child was uncooperative,
refusing to answer questions from the witness stand.7 2 The court
permitted the child's removal to a separate room for examination
and allowed the defendant and the jury to observe the testimony
on a closed-circuit monitor in the courtroom.7 1 When the child
witness was again uncooperative, the court authorized a therapist
to question the child with the attorneys present. 74 After the child
failed to respond to this interview, the court granted the state's
motion to continue the child's testimony with the therapist in
the separate room and with all other parties located in the court
watching the examination on a television screen.75
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, reversing the conviction,
held that "the trial court did not require the State to stay within
minimum constitutional guidelines and, hence, denied the
defendant his rights under the due process and confrontation
6 See State v. Warford, 389 N.W.2d 575 (Neb. 1986).
, 389 N.W.2d 575 (Neb. 1986).
7, Id. at 577-78.
I d. at 578.
'3 Id. The trial court was not acting according to a statutory provision in permitting
the closed-circuit testimony. Other courts have denied the prosecution's motion to
implement special procedures to facilitate child testimony in the absence of statutory
guidelines. See In re S. Children, 424 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1980) (The court
denied an application to hear a child's testimony in camera in the absence of a statutory
provision explicitly permitting this procedure.); see also Hochheiser v. Superior Court,
208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (The court held that closed-circuit testimony
is "such a far-reaching innovation in a criminal trial [that it] 'is more appropriately left
to the Legislature for initial consideration.' ") (quoting People v. Collie, 177 Cal. Rptr.
458, 464 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)). For a discussion of the California state legislature's
reaction to the Hochheiser decision, see Vartabedian & Vartabedian, supra note 1, at
19.
'4 Warford, 389 N.W.2d at 579.
75 Id.
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clauses." ' 76 Separating the witness from the courtroom foreclosed
the possibility of physical confrontation. Also, Warford could
not communicate with his attorney during part of the testi-
'nony; therefore, he was unable to "confront the witness through
counsel."77
Some state statutes do not have explicit provisions outlining
methods of defendant-attorney communication when the attor-
ney leaves the courtroom to cross-examine the child.7 8 Even
though a trial court may order some method of communication,
such as a telephone system, practical problems remain which
endanger effective cross-examination.7 9 Telephone communica-
76 Id. at 581.
Id. at 582; cf. Hightower v. State, 736 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
Hightower was convicted of "the offenses of aggravated kidnapping and indecency with
a child." Id. at 950. Pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.071(3),
the trial judge allowed the child to testify via closed-circuit television from the jury
room. The attorneys, the video operator, the judge, and the court reporter accompanied
the child. Hightower and the jury watched the child's testimony on monitors in the
courtroom. The judge denied Hightower's request for two-way radio or telephone
communication between Hightower and his attorney during the televised testimony. The
judge only told Hightower that he could "interrupt the questioning at any time he
wanted to confer with his attorney" by asking "the bailiff to knock on the door to the
room where the child was being questioned." The Texas Court of Appeals held that
neither article 38.071(3) nor the particular trial procedures violated the confrontation
right because Hightower had "ample opportunity to confer with counsel and through
counsel to cross-examine the witness who testified against him." Id. at 952.
The Texas Court of Appeals failed to recognize that Hightower's ability to interrupt
the child's testimony did not permit full and effective cross-examination of the child.
Requesting that the bailiff knock on the jury room door to interrupt the testimony did
not allow spontaneous and continuous communication between Hightower and his at-
torney. The particular procedure is so much more awkward than communicating in
person that a defendant may decide not to interrupt the child's testimony even though
he wishes to communicate with his attorney; since the defendant must "interrupt" to
communicate, he may feel pressure to suppress any inclinations to confer with his
attorney.
The Texas Court of Appeals also ignored the trial judge's apparent violation of
article 38.071(3). Contrary to the express language of this statute, the trial judge and
the court reporter left the courtroom to attend the questioning of the child in the jury
room. Id.
" See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(3) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
, See Willis, 716 S.W.2d at 235 (Stephens, C.J., dissenting).
The majority opinion-no matter how carefully one slices it-has virtually
eliminated the right of effective cross-examination. One can only imagine
the multitude of unacceptable logistical scenarios when the accused is in
one room attempting to communicate with his counsel in another room.
One can picture the accused or a messenger attempting to run back and
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tion does not allow the defendant and his or her attorney to
convey information to each other in writing, through body lan-
guage, or by simple nudges; this communication could be ex-
tremely important, especially when the prosecution is examining
the witness and the defendant wishes fo convey information to
his or her attorney which may be influential to rebut the pros-
ecution during cross-examination. 0
In an attempt to protect the child from trauma associated
with the testimonial process of child abuse cases and to reduce
the state's infringements into the rights of the accused, the New
York legislature enacted somewhat lengthy provisions for closed-
circuit testimony. 81 After a finding that a child witness is "vul-
nerable," and that "under the facts and circumstances of the
particular case, the defendant's constitutional rights to an im-
partial jury or of confrontation will not be impaired," a court
may order the child's removal from the courtroom. 8 2 The statute
allows the attorneys to examine the child witness in a separate
room away from the defendant, or, in the alternative, it permits
the attorneys to remain in the courtroom to examine the child
through the use of two-way closed-circuit television. 3 The draft-
ers of the New York statute attempted to solve the defendant-
attorney communicktion difficulties by providing the two-way
forth with notes everytime a question seems necessary. Or, perhaps, a
private telephone line or a private radio communication system would be
provided. Under these circumstances it is difficult to imagine that cross-
examination could exist as a helpful tool for the defense and I believe any
trial attorney would find these conditions intolerable. Any substantial
limitation on the effectiveness of cross-examination strikes right to the
heart of the right of confrontation.
Id. (emphasis in original).
10 In addition to interfering with the right to confront the witness, communication
difficulties may impede the right to effective representation by counsel. Cf. Illinois v.
Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
" See N.Y. CIuM. PROC. LAw § 65 (McKinney Supp. 1987). For an application
of this procedure, see People v. Henderson, 503 N.Y.S.2d 238 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
12 N.Y. CRiu. PROC. LAW § 65.20(11) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
11 Id. at § 65.30(5) ("[The attorney for the defendant and the district attorney
shall also remain in the courtroom unless the court is satisfied that their presence in the
testimonial room will not impede full and private communication between the defendant
and his or her attorney. .. ").
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closed-circuit alternate procedure; 84 however, this procedure makes
cross-examination difficult because the child may not respond
to the questions and because the defendant's attorney may be
unable to communicate effectively with the child witness via
closed-circuit television. 85
B. Demeanor of the Witness
The fact finder in a child abuse case may have problems
observing the demeanor of the child witness to weigh the credi-
bility of his or her statements .86 While some advocates of the
closed-circuit procedure do not demonstrate concern for de-
meanor observation problems, 87 courts often point out that tech-
nological advances in the telecommunications field enable a court
to employ a closed-circuit testimony procedure that gives the
fact finder an adequate opportunity to judge the child's credi-
bility. 88
Recently, in Commonwealth v. Willis,89 the Kentucky Su-
preme Court narrowly held9° that provisions of the Kentucky
statute which permit the use of closed-circuit testimony9' and
" Other state statutes also provide for the use of two-way closed-circuit television.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1987).
"But see Child Sexual Abuse Victims in the Courts: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Juvenile Justice, supra note 2, at 81 ("Two-way transmission of tlhe testimony
will allow the defendants and each child witness to see and hear each other. As such,
the testimony will be presented in a manner which is legally indistinguishable from
testimony given by a witness who is physically present in the courtroom.") (statement
of Lael Rubin, Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles, California).
" See Burt, The Case Against Courtroom TV, TRIAL, July 1976, at 62, 66 (Tele-
vised testimony may prevent "the jury from accurately observing the actual demeanor
of the witness.").
17 See, e.g., supra note 46.
1 See Sheppard, 484 A.2d at 1333 (At the hearing on the state's motion for closed-
circuit testimony, a video expert testified that the transmission of image and voices
would be clear.); Algarin, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 981 ("It is apparent to this court from a
demonstration of the equipment used in this case that closed-circuit television has the
capacity to present clear and accurate sounds and images to the defendant, the witness,
the judge, the jury and the public.").
-716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986).
- Justice Wintersheimer delivered the opinion of the court in which Justices Gant,
Leibson, and Vance concurred. Chief Justice Stephens, Justices Stephenson, and White
dissented. Id.
91 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.350(3) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
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recorded video testimony for trial use92 do not violate the sixth
amendment 93 or section eleven94 of the Kentucky Constitution.95
Willis was indicted for first-degree sexual abuse upon a five-
year-old child.96 After a competency hearing in which the child
was unresponsive, the prosecution submitted a motion to proceed
under Kentucky Revised Statutes sections 421.350(3) or (4), the
closed-circuit and recorded television testimony provisionsY The
trial court refused to allow the use of the television procedures,
holding that they were unconstitutional. 98
92 Id. at § 421.350(4).
93 See supra text accompanying note 15.
94 "In all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right ... to meet the witnesses
face to face." KY. CONST. § 11.
91 Even though the Kentucky Constitution uses different words than the United
States Constitution, see supra note 65, the Kentucky Supreme Court emphasized that
"Ithe requirement in the Kentucky Constitution to 'meet witnesses face-to-face' is
basically the same as the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution which provides a
right of confrontation." Willis, 716 S.W.2d at 227.
Id. at 226.
97 Id. "The Commonwealth's proposal urged that if a videotape of the testimony
could be made under KRS § 421.350(4), the court would be able to judge from a review
of the tape prior to trial whether the witness was competent." Brief for Appellant at 2,
Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986).
Willis, 716 S.W.2d at 226. The trial court, in its unpublished opinion, stated:
The question is whether the privilege of viewing a witness through a one-
way mirror or a video monitor is a constitutionally acceptable substitute
for face to face confrontation. It is the opinion of this Court that it is
not.
This Court is aware of the strong public interest in the prosecution
of child abuse cases, particularly sexual abuse. This Court is also aware of
the sometimes unsurmountable [sic] difficulties in getting a small child to
tell in a courtroom in the presence of the Defendant the events of sexual
abuse. Children, even of tender years, can be and frequently are competent
witnesses to their own sexual abuse. Certainly, there is no truth in the idea
that children never tell the truth.
On the other hand, closely following the wave of public concern
regarding child abuse may be seen the wave of public concern regarding
false accusations of child abuse and the irreparable damage which can
occur. The fact is that it is a very difficult and sometimes impossible
decision to be made as to whether a child is telling the truth under certain
circumstances. At best, it is a difficult determination even for well trained
and experienced investigators.
Nevertheless, the difficulty of the task alone should not be justifica-
tion for abbrogating well established constitutional rights. Our traditional
methods of criminal law enforcement simply do not lend themselves well
to protect against child abuse. Methods that are more effective and less
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On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the trial
court by holding that the closed-circuit and recorded testimony
procedures do not violate the defendant's confrontation right. 99
In deciding that "a video monitor is a constitutionally acceptable
substitute for face-to-face confrontation,"'00 the court empha-
sized that the procedures permit the jury to "evaluate the de-
meanor and credibility of the witness."'' 1
In his dissent, Chief Justice Stephens strongly protested the
court's decision: "The majority has put the imprimatur of this
Court on a new revision of the rule which says that the right of
confrontation is no longer 'face to face,' but is rather, 'face-
to television screen-to face.' "0 Chief Justice Stephens argued
that the jury could not have a "complete picture" of the child
witness by watching the child's testimony on a television moni-
tor. 03
dangerous to the welfare both of the child and the accused must be
developed.
Evidently, it was the thought of the Legislature that the rights of
children, traditionally wards of the state, should outweigh the rights of the
individual. However, the individual rights and liberties provided our citizens
under our constitutions have served us well and should not be abandoned
except in the very last resort. Under our constitution a criminal accused
has the right to meet witnesses against him face to face and it is the opinion
of this Court that "face to face" does not include a one-way mirror or a
T.V. monitor nor do such procedures adequately protect the Defendant's
rights of personal confrontation and cross examination.
Opinion and Order of George E. Barker, Judge, Fayette Circuit Court, Commonwealth
v. Willis, No. 84-CR-346, at 4-5.
" Willis, 716 S.W.2d at 232. The court also dismissed Willis' argument that the
statute violates the separation of powers doctrine of the Kentucky Constitution. Id.
0 Id. at 228.
01 Id. at 227; cf. People v. Kasben, 404 N.W.2d 723 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). In
Kasben, the trial court ordered the use of televised testimony at a hearing to determine
the competency of a four-year-old alleged victim of child abuse. Id. at 723-24. At trial,
however, the child testified in the defendant's presence. The Michigan Court of Appeals
held that the trial court procedures "were sufficient to protect the defendant's rights."
Id. at 724. The child was subject to full cross-examination at trial; therefore, Kasben appears
to be consistent with Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2658. On the other hand, however, the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Willis addressed the constitutionality of a televised testimony
statute rather than simply examining the use of televised testimony in competency
hearings; therefore, Willis goes far beyond Kasben and Stincer. See supra note 63.
:"2 Willis, 716 S.W.2d at 234 (Stephens, C.J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 235 (Stephens, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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Although the closed-circuit testimony procedure allows the
fact finder to examine the child's demeanor and to evaluate
credibility, a juror's decision on whether the child is telling the
truth will be influenced by the technology.1°4 As a result, a
juror's judgment on the child's credibility may be different when
the child is physically present in the courtroom than when the
child's testimony comes to a juror by television.
Also, the closed-circuit testimony procedure may cause the
fact finder to grant special significance to the child's testimony.
"[lt is quite conceivable that the credibility of a witness whose
testimony is presented via closed-circuit television may be en-
hanced by the phenomenon called status-conferral; it is recog-
104 On appeal, Willis argued that the .available technology does not allow the jury
to observe adequately the child's demeanor:
[W]hile on the surface the videotape statute purports to identically transmit
an image to the jury which it would otherwise see in person, common
sense shows that this cannot be so, under the current state of the art. First,
the projected image on the screen is by nature onedimensional. Second,
the camera operator will have the function of focusing and zooming in
and out on the witness and the surroundings, a function jurors automati-
cally perform on their own. If the camera zooms in on the child's face,'
the jurors will be unable to observe her entire body, including hand and
leg movements. The opposite effect is also to be expected if the camera is
focused on the entire person.
Brief for Appellee at 7, Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986); cf. G.
MILER & N. FONTES, VIDEOTAPE ON TRiAL (1979).
Full-screen videotaped presentations have the potential of reducing the
amount of nonverbal information provided to jurors. The nonverbal be-
haviors exhibited by witnesses and attorneys might be more difficult to
observe when a full-screen panoramic shot of the trial proceedings is used.
More specifically, the facial affect displays would be difficult to see when
video cameras are not tightly focused in on testifying witnesses. It is also
conceivable, given this loss of information, that juror interest in videotaped
proceedings may be adversely affected. However, a camera shot which
only presented the testifying witness and perhaps the interrogating attorney
would also result in a loss of information for jurors. They would be denied
access to the nonverbal responses of other trial participants sitting in the
courtroom.
Id. at 139-40. But see Sheppard, 484 A.2d at 1341.
We can also take judicial notice of the fact of the ubiguity of television
sets, as revealed by the 1970 census [96% of all households had at least
one black and white television set], and recent availability of low-cost
television cameras. With such widespread availability of television comes a
familiarity with its technical characteristics and distortions.
Id. (quoting People v. Moran, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413, 420 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)).
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nized that the media bestows prestige and enhances the authority
of an individual by legitimizing his status."'' 05 The jury, watching
testimony on television, may give the child's statements greater
weight than other testimony. 1°6 More significantly, shielding the
child witness may stigmatize the defendant and lead the jury to
presume guilt.'0 7 Trial court instructions informing the jury not
105 Hochheiser, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
,06 See Graham, supra note 10, at 75 ("Whenever litigants use an alternative to
face to face confrontation, there is a risk that the jury will give weight to the alternative
procedure itself in deciding guilt or innocence."); Vartabedian & Vartabedian, supra
note 1, at 48 ("[The juror might attach excessive importance to the fact of televising
and give the testimony greater weight than would otherwise be the case.").
"' See Hochheiser, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 279 ("[T]he presentation of a witness' testi-
mony via closed-circuit television may affect the presumption of innocence by creating
prejudice in the minds of the jurors towards the defendant similar to that created by
the use of physical restraints on a defendant in the jury's prsence."); see also Appellee's
Petition for Rehearing, Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986).
In the first sentence of the Opinion of the Court by Justice Winter-
sheimer, the child witness against Leslie Willis is referred to as a "5-year-
old sexual abuse victim." The Opinion repeatedly refers to both the child
in this case and other children in similar circumstances to be "victims"
and the tenor of the Opinion suggests a pre-conceived notion that a person
accused with the crime of sexually abusing a child is most certainly guilty,
with the constitutional protections afforded such a person but legal hurdles
to be jumped to achieve the inevitable conviction.
The Opinion's constant reference to the child as a victim is indicative
of the public's tendency to pre-judge a person accused of a sex abuse
crime. The presumption of innocence should not be taken lightly; it should
be effectively preserved by this Court's acceptance of the fact that a jury
will obviously think Leslie Willis is guilty of doing something to the young
girl who must be hidden behind the screen for her protection.
Id. at 5-6 (emphasis in original); cf. Pauley, The Emerging "Victim Factor" in the
Supreme Court's Criminal Jurisprudence: Should Victim's Interests Ever Prevent a Court
from Overturning a Conviction and Ordering a Retrial?, 61 IND. L.J. 149, 157 (1985-
86):
It may be quickly conceded that the victims of crime are worthy of
sympathy and that their interests have in general been too long neglected.
It may also be taken as a "given" that society has a stake in not unneces- -
sarily prolonging or intensifying a victim's ordeal in testifying beyond
constitutional requirements, since the ordeal, if deemed too onerous, may
deter victims from reporting to the proper authorities violations involving
peculiarly degrading experiences. These precepts do not, however, begin to
justify a rule of law that would require courts to make judgmental decisions
about the extent of a victim's anticipated ordeal and, when deemed severe,
to refrain from reversing a conviction and ordering a new trial when the
basis for the reversal is a new or novel right or the invocation of a
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to draw inferences from the use of closed-circuit testimony0 8
may be ineffective."09
CONCLUSION
In an attempt to protect a child witness from a traumatic
testimonial experience, proponents of the closed-circuit testi-
supervisory power.
But see State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1986), prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 3260
(1987). The trial court placed a screen in front of Coy during the testimony of two girls,
the alleged victims of Coy's abuse. Id. at 733. On appeal, Coy argued that the "trial
court's ruling allowing use of the screening device impermissibly prejudiced his right to
a fair trial in violation of the fourteenth amendment." He argued that the screen "created
the same inference of guilt as can prison garb, or the use of handcuffs or leg irons."
Id. at 734. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed Coy's conviction by concluding that the
"use of the screen was not inherently prejudicial." Id. at 735. For more information
about the Coy case, see Coyle, Application of Confrontation Clause a Difficult Issue in
Child Abuse Cases, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 2, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
Prof. Paul J. Papak of the University of Iowa College of Law, who
is representing Mr. Coy before the [United States] Supreme Court, says he
recreated the scene by entering the courtroom where the defendant was
convicted and dragging out the screen to see how it worked.
"It's hard to adequately describe its impact," he says. The court-
room's lights were turned off, its blinds were drawn, and a panel of four,
bright-focus lights were trained onto the screen in order to activate the
one-way coating.
The two girls could see only the reflection of the judge's bench next
to them, he says. The defendant saw a darkened image of the two witnesses.
In the trial record, Professor Papak notes, the judge described the effect
as "dramatic" and "eerie."
Id. at 10, col. 1.
'M See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(d)(2) (West Supp. 1987) (The court shall "[i]nstruct
the members of the jury that they are to draw no inference from the use of two-way
closed-circuit television as a means of facilitating the testimony of the minor."); N.Y.
Csw. PRoc. LAW § 65.30(6) (McKinney Supp. 1987) ("Upon request of the defendant,
the court shall instruct the jury that they are to draw no inference from the use of live,
two-way closed-circuit television in the examination of the vulnerable child witness.").
109 See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). "IT]here are some contexts
in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and
the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human
limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored." Id. at 135. But see Wildermuth v.
State, 530 A.2d 275 (Md. 1987).
Nor do we think that the use of the closed-circuit television necessarily
suggests anything about a defendant's culpability. The jury was instructed
not to give the televised testimony any greater or lessor weight than if it
had been given in the courtroom. It might well have assumed that televising
a child's testimony was simply a procedure used to reduce the trauma any
child might suffer through public testimony. We are not persuaded that
this procedure tended to brand [the defendant] as guilty.
Id. at 292.
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mony procedure have overlooked the constitutional importance
of safeguarding the rights of the accused." 0 Sympathy for the
child witness does not justify infringements upon a defendant's
confrontation right."' If the defendant does not have the op-
110 See Children's Justice Act: Hearing on S. 140 Before the Subcomm. on Children,
Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1985).
Given the misuse of the right of confrontation and to cross-exami-
nation by defense attorney's [sic] until it becomes not a method of deter-
mining the truth but a means to destroy evidence, the crucial testimony of
the child, is it any wonder that so few child molesters ever get convicted?
These disturbing trends must be reversed. Teaching children to speak
out and report their abuse is just a first step, we need to be able to
guarantee them that they will not be further abused and traumatized by
the administrative and judicial system after they make that initial cry for
help.
Id. (statement of Senator Paula Hawkins); Brief for Respondent, Kentucky v. Stincer,
107 S. Ct. 2658 (1987).
One of the most disturbing aspects of the Commonwealth's position in this
matter is its unspoken, but apparent, belief that the prosecuting witnesses
in these types of cases are invariably telling the truth and that the defen-
dants are invariably guilty. This premise is necgssarily implicit in the Com-
monwealth's argument. Their position, quite simply, is that the defendant
in a sex abuse case is guilty and that the end (securing a conviction)
justifies the means (violating the constitutional rights of confrontation and
due process).
Id. at 50; cf. Freedman, Videotaped Testimony Allowed for Child Victims of Sex Crimes,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 10, 1984, at I, col. 3. Upon approving amendments to New York's
Criminal Procedure Law to allow videotaped testimony in child abuse cases, Governor
Mario Cuomo said: "This new law will limit that trauma and prevent needless anguish
for young crime victims while encouraging the aggressive prosecution of the perpetrators
of these crimes." Id. But see Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State
Legislation and Other Emerging Legal Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 DICK. L.
REv. 645 (1984-85). "New methods to protect children nevertheless must be considered
in the context of our constitutional system that values liberty and assumes an individual
innocent until proven guilty by the state." Id. at 665.
See Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986).
[Tihe accused constitutional rights are preeminent. They cannot rightfully
be impaired by either the General Assembly or the Judiciary, no matter
how appealing the reason for doing so may appear at the time. This
includes the constitutional protections afforded the accused in both the
United States and Kentucky Bill of Rights. There are no counterbalancing
constitutional guarantees of victim's rights which justify their impairment.
Id. at 232 (Leibson, J., concurring).
It is my personal view that this right is not to be abbrogated. Con-
venience or ease of prosecution or any criminal offense is not, and should
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portunity to participate fully in the cross-examination of the
child and if the jury cannot observe adequately the child's
demeanor, then the defendant does not enjoy the right "to be
confronted with the witnesses against him."1 2 Without these
"mechanisms of confrontation," '  a danger exists that unreli-
able evidence may lead to the defendant's conviction." '
Ending physical confrontation between the accused and the
child witness eliminates the defendant's ability to participate
fully in cross-examination 5 and makes defendant-attorney corn-
not be, a factor in interpreting the basic rights of an accused person.
... No one does, and I certainly do not, condone the virulent and
growing crime of child abuse. But, no one should, and I certainly do not,
condone any policy of the General Assembly which effectively negates a
constitutional right.
Id. at 234-36 (Stephens, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original); see also State v.
Warford, 389 N.W.2d 575 (Neb. 1986). "The need to adopt measures to ease the
emotional burden placed on a child witness cannot, however, be an excuse for stripping
the defendant of his constitutional rights." Id. at 580; 6th Amendment Outweighs Desire
to Protect Children, Lexington Herald-Leader, January 24, 1987, at A6, col. I (editorial)
("[W]e would not question the argument that these [child-abuse] victims need to be
protected to the fullest extent possible. But neither the weight of public opinion nor the
need to protect victims can override the rights afforded to every American citizen under
the U.S. Constitution."). But see People v. Algarin, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1986). "[T]he compelling state interests involved with the protection of the emotional
well-being of child sex offense victims and the need for their testimony to ensure
successful prosecutions more than outweigh any infringement of defendant's right of
confrontation arising out of the selective utilization of closed-circuit television." Id. at
983.
... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
"' Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (1986); see supra text accompanying note
23.
14 Cf. Brief for Respondent, Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658 (1987).
Actual sex abuse case histories, as reflected in articles and other publica-
tions, reflect that it is not always the child who is the innocent victim. It
is well known that custody battles can result in sexual abuse charges being
leveled by one parent upon the other parent. Because small children can
often be manipulated and are susceptible to influence, especially by parents,
this type of charge is easy to make and difficult to defend.
Id. at 47; Reynolds, Courts Struggle to Balance Suspect's Rights, Child's Needs, Lex-
ington Herald-Leader, February 16, 1987, at A12, col. I (David Richart, Executive
Director of Kentucky Youth Advocates, Inc., said that "[f]alse allegations of sexual
abuse in child-custody cases are increasing ... [and that] his agency'had received
numerous calls lately from parents who say they flave been accused of sexual abuse as
a ploy by the other parent to win custody.").
"I See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
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munication difficult. 16 A jury, unable to examine a child's de-
meanor completely by watching testimony via closed-circuit
television, cannot evaluate credibility sufficiently." 7 Further-
more, the use of the closed-circuit procedure legitimizes the
child's alleged status as a victim of child abuse which may lead
the jury to presume that the accused is guilty.""
The use of the closed-circuit testimony procedure in cases of
alleged child abuse decreases the defendant's opportunity to
challenge the witness through cross-examination and increases
the chance that the jury will misjudge the child's credibility.
Therefore, a "face-to television screen-to face" 119 encounter
violates the defendant's sixth amendment confrontation right: it
inhibits the finding of truth in a criminal trial.
John Patrick Grant***
2"6 See supra notes 66-85 and accompanying text.
"7 See supra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
"9 Willis, 716 S.W.2d at 234 (Stephens, C.J., dissenting); see supra text accompa-
nying note 102.
*** I give my apologies to U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Abner J. Mikva for my
footnotes. See Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U. CoLo. L. REv. 647 (1984-85). "If
footnotes were a rational form of communication, Darwinian selection would have
resulted in the eyes being set vertically rather than on an inefficient horizontal plane."
Id. at 648.
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